Friday, July 8, 2011

Sixth Circuit Addresses "Associational Discrimination" Under the ADA

A little used provision in the ADA prohibits "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).  Under this provision, the EEOC has explained,
an employer may not treat a worker less favorably based on stereotypical assumptions about the worker’s ability to perform job duties satisfactorily while also providing care to a relative or other individual with a disability. For example, an employer may not refuse to hire a job applicant whose wife has a disability because the employer assumes that the applicant would have to use frequent leave and arrive late due to his responsibility to care for his wife.  
The Sixth Circuit appeal involved an employee, Stansberry, who managed the employer's, Air Wisconsin, operations at the Kalamazoo Michigan Airport from 1999 until he was fired on July 26, 2007.  In the mid-1990s Stansberry’s wife developed Polyarteritis Nodosa, a very rare and debilitating autoimmune disorder. The treatment for this condition "involves medications to suppress the immune system, including prednisone and cyclophosphamide."  It is expensive.  Costing Air Wisconsin's insurer some $4,000 every six weeks.

At some point in 2007, Air Wisconsin increased it operations in Kalamazoo, growing from eleven employees to twenty-five. Stansberry was responsible for ensuring all employees properly carried out their jobs and there were several significant problems with the new hires. Between February and May 2007, six different employees received a total of nine security violation letters from the Kalamazoo airport director. Stansberry failed to notify Air Wisconsin’s corporate headquarters about the violations, they learned about the violation only when the Transportation Security Administration sent a letter of investigation to Air Wisconsin’s headquarters.

Stansberry, already had issues with his boss, Mulder.  When Mulder reviewed the security violations, he let the TSA know he would be taking "severe disciplinary action" against Stansberry.  Air Wisconsin asserts that it terminated Stansberry for poor performance based on his failure to stay within budget, failure to report security violations, and improper supervision of employees, which led to the security violations in the first place. The prepared termination letter Mulder brought with him to the meeting, however, simply mentioned the security violations.

Relying on a Seventh Circuit decision, Larimer v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit decision summarized the types of theories under which an associational discrimination claim could be brought:
Several circuits, including this Court in an unpublished opinion, have relied on Larimer’s outline of three theories into which “association discrimination” plaintiffs generally fall: (1) “expense”; (2) “disability by association”; and (3) “distraction.” The “expense” theory covers situations where an employee suffers an adverse employment action because of his or her association with a disabled individual covered under the employer’s health plan, which is costly to the employer. The “disability by association” theory encompasses two related situations. Either the employer fears that the employee may contract the disability of the person he or she is associated with (for example the employee’s partner is infected with HIV and the employer fears the employee may become infected), or the employee is genetically predisposed to develop a disability that his or her relatives have. The “distraction” theory is based on the employee’s being somewhat inattentive at work because of the disability of someone with whom he or she is associated. Id. at 700.
Stansberry relied only on a “distraction” theory.  Stansberry, who lacked direct evidence, argued that the court should infer discrimination because he was discharged shortly after his wife's condition worsened.  The court rejected the argument:
although her condition grew worse immediately before Stansberry was terminated, Air Wisconsin had been aware of her illness for many years. Because Air Wisconsin knew of her disability for a long period of time, this undercuts the inference that Stansberry’s termination was based on unfounded fears that his wife’s disability might cause him to be inattentive at work.
While the court held Stansberry couldn't establish a prima facie case, it also held he could not show his discharge was because of his association with his wife:
Importantly, while Stansberry’s poor performance at work was likely due to his wife’s illness, that is irrelevant under this provision of the Act. Stansberry was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation on account of his wife’s disability. Cf., e.g., Larimer, 370 F.3d at 700. Therefore, because his discharge was based on actually performing his job unsatisfactorily, and not fears that his wife’s disability might prevent him from performing adequately, Air Wisconsin’s conduct is not prohibited by this section of the Act.
There is an important caveat to the decision.  While the ADA does not require an accommodation in these circumstances, the FMLA (which may not have applied to Stansberry) might require time off from work.  

The EEOC also points out that "an employer must avoid treating an employee differently than other employees because of his or her association with a person with a disability."   It gives two examples:

Example J:  Kyung, an employee at an accounting firm, requests a week of unpaid leave and is told by her supervisor that there will be no difficulty in granting the leave.  Kyung then mentions that she will be using the leave to care for her mother with a disability, who is coming into town for medical treatments.  The supervisor denies the leave request, telling Kyung that the firm's leave policy is not intended to cover this type of situation and that she should hire someone to look after her mother.  A few days later, the supervisor approves Diego's request for a week of unpaid leave to attend a father-son camp with his son.  If the firm grants requests for unpaid leave for certain personal or family reasons, it is a violation of the ADA's association provision to deny Kyung's request because she wishes to use the time to assist her mother with a disability.  
Example K:  A law firm permits its attorneys to use 100 hours of administrative leave a year to provide pro bono legal services.  One attorney, Sylvia, wants to use these hours to work with a non-profit organization that provides legal and other services to individuals with psychiatric disabilities.  The law firm denies her request because it does not believe that this type of work will reflect well on its image.  If the firm allows attorneys to use administrative leave to provide pro bono legal services, it is a violation of the association provision of the ADA to deny Sylvia's request because she wishes to use the time to assist individuals with disabilities.