6th Circuit Rejects ADA Claim from Poor Performing State Employee

In a published (and therefore binding precedent) decision issued today, the Sixth Circuit upheld the poor performance-based firing of an individual with a disability by Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.  The interesting thing about the decision is that the employee (named Whitfield) blamed some, but not all, of her performance issues on her disability and the Department's failure to "successfully" accommodate them.  The court rejected this approach saying:

Although Whitfield attributes her spelling errors to a lack of spell check in the computer program used to input complaints, she made serious spelling and grammatical errors even in programs that had a spell-check feature. In December 2007, nearly three months into her employment, Whitfield neglected to enter the required county on numerous inspection forms and, on another form, entered the wrong county. And although she had difficulties using her computer due to her disability, she also made errors in assignments that were not performed on a computer, such as organizing files alphabetically. On other occasions, she mailed letters without zip codes or complete addresses. Many of Whitfield’s errors can be attributed to nothing more than  Whitfield’s lack of attention to detail, and Whitfield admitted as much in her deposition, stating that she “just wasn’t looking that close” when addressing mailings. At bottom, Whitfield routinely made serious errors that were unrelated to her disability or to a lack of accommodations.
In this context, Whitfield must do more than point to the facts that Defendants knew she was disabled and failed to provide all of her requested accommodations. Although these facts may help Whitfield establish her prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, in order to survive Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, she needs to show that Defendants’ explanation for her termination could be deemed pretextual. Whitfield focuses only on the problems she had entering complaints into the computer, arguing that, if she had been given all the accommodations she requested, she would have not had the same problems, and, further, other employees made similar errors or were not required to enter complaints at all. Appellant’s Br. at 18–21. Although Whitfield succeeds in creating a genuine issue as to whether she could have adequately performed that particular function with the proper accommodations, she does not address the serious errors she routinely made while performing tasks that were not at all impacted by her disabilities, such as confirming that an envelope has a zip code before dropping it in the mail. Because Whitfield does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was fired due to her disability, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was proper.

The holding let the court avoid addressing whether the Department had failed to reasonably accommodate the employee.  The Department had made several attempts to accommodate her but there were technological limitations that the IT employees could not overcome relating to placement of her monitor and the use of a one-handed  keyboard.

Employers must still make reasonable accommodations, of course, but this decision provides reassurance that an employer may terminate a disabled employee for poor performance, especially where the performance issues are not caused by the disability.  Terminations for performance issues that are caused by a disability require more thought but even the EEOC acknowledges that employees with a disability may be held to the same performance standards as other employees so long as the employee is provided the reasonable accommodations "required to assist an employee in meeting a specific production standard."

Another aspect of the decision is worth mentioning.  The court expressly rejected the employee's argument that all she needed to do to get to a jury was to establish a prima facie case.  Given it is very easy to establish a prima facie case, that provides employer with greater security when dealing with employee performance problems.

Must an Employer Provide Lodging as a Reasonable Accommodation

I'm always looking for unusual legal precedents.  I shouldn't be surprised when they come from unusual sources. I receive emails from the Government Accountability Office listing the Comptroller General decisions they issue.  The Comptroller General of the U.S. GAO issues legal decisions and legal opinions on appropriations law, bid protests, and other issues of federal law.  Agencies can ask the Comptroller General for advice on whether federal law permits a specific expenditure. 

Today's e-mail from the GAO addressed whether the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General, could us appropriated funds to pay for a reasonable accommodation for an employee who wanted the IG's office to provide her with lodging closer to where she would be performing audits.  

The Comptroller General decision addresses an unusual accommodation request.  Federal employees, by statute, are paid lodging expenses when they are "away from the employee's designated post of duty."  The employee's need for lodging, however, was not away from her post of duty.  There was, in other words, no authorization for paying the employees lodging for these trips. 

The Comptroller then addressed whether the appropriated funds could be spent nonetheless, as part of a reasonable accommodation, and concluded they could not because the requested accommodation was not reasonable:

An employer, however, is not required to provide for accommodations that fall outside the scope of employment, like commuting. Laresca v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 161 F. Supp. 2d. 323 (D.N.J. 2001). In this case the employee's drive is akin to a commute, traveling from the employee's home to the work site. Reasonable accommodations are directed at enabling an employee to perform the essential functions of the job itself, 29 C.F.R. sect. 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), and federal courts have held that activities like commuting to and from the workplace fall outside the scope of a job. Consequently, an employer is not obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation for such activities.

The Comptroller General encouraged the IG's office to find some other accommodation that would be effective.

Quantifying the Cost of a Reasonable Accommodation

I am something of an oral argument junkie. I read Supreme Court oral argument transcripts and listen to oral arguments when the Oyez Project updates its archive. One court of appeals, the Seventh Circuit, makes it easy to listen to arguments as they release oral argument recordings to as a podcast (including to iTunes) the same day of the argument. Other federal courts of appeals (1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th and Federal Circuits) release online oral argument recordings, the Eighth Circuit also releases a podcast (including on iTunes). Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit (and several others, including the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit) keeps its oral argument recordings to itself, requiring counsel to request the recording "in writing" and even then only releasing the recording upon the payment of a $26 fee.

When I am not working, I'll listen to the "latest" in oral arguments. (I get a lot of eye-rolls and a few jaw drops when I admit I listen to these arguments.) Of course, the arguments are most interesting (or should that be, "less dull") when the judges on the panel ask informed questions. It gets downright entertaining when the judges ask questions the lawyers can't (or won't) answer. (Clients may be dismayed to know that this happens a lot more than they might think.)

One such case, Ekstrand v School District of Somerset, was argued before the Seventh Circuit in September; the decision was issued today. I remember the argument because the judges on the panel (judges who are not considered to be "liberal" judges by any means) cut straight to the most problematic aspect of the School District's case. But I am getting ahead of myself.

Ms. Ekstrand taught first grade and kindergarten (successfully for 5 years) until she was assigned a classroom with no windows. Ms. Ekstrand, it seems, has "seasonal affective disorder" (a form of depression) and natural light helps alleviate the symptoms; artificial light, in turn, causes her difficulty. (The court found she at least arguably met the definition of disability but I'll omit any discussion of the issue given the 2008 ADA Amendments). Before the 2005-06 school year, Ekstrand asked (repeatedly) for a "natural light" room. There were two available (one teacher was willing to move and the other vacant one was being held anticipating that the school might add another third grade class). The School District worked with Ekstrand a good bit (she complained of other aspects of the inside room) but did not move her to an outside room.

Ekstrand's symptoms (fatigue, anxiety, hypervigilance, tearfulness, racing thoughts, and trouble organizing tasks) increased after the school year began; she sought medical attention, and continued to press for an outside room. After going on medical leave, she presented the school (through its "workers' compensation representative") with a note from her physician which explained that it was important for individuals who had seasonal affective disorder to have natural light and that the current episode of depression was likely caused by being in the windowless room. Ms. Ekstrand eventually quit (the court rejected her assertion that she was constructively discharged).

At argument (the lower court had dismissed the case), the court wanted to know why the school didn't move Ms. Ekstrand to the classroom so she could get natural light. The judges pressed the School District to explain what it would have cost them to move her. The School District's counsel didn't (and wouldn't) say, preferring instead to focus on what the School District had done for her instead.

Now, in fairness to the School District's counsel, there is a good bit of stress put on how the employer and employee must engage in an "interactive process." In addition, Ms. Ekstrand had already left work on medical leave more than a month before she submitted the note from her physician. By that time, there wasn't a lot of "interactive process" to be had.

The court, however, viewed the School District as arguing that the "interactive process" means the "when we get around to it" process. The move, it turns out, would have cost nothing and the disruption would have been minimal (recall that at least one teacher was willing to trade classrooms). So why didn't, the court wanted to know, the School District agree to it?

The bottom line message this decision sends is that it is a mistake to equate the "interactive process" with a "reasonable accommodation." The interactive process isn't an end result; it is a means to an end. The interactive process would have allowed the school to have proposed other "less expensive" accommodation "so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the individual being accommodated." (29 C.F.R Part 1630 Appendix to 1630.9)

The School District thought its initial efforts met this requirement but it turns out their "good faith" steps (as even the court described them) fell short of the ultimate mandate. They were not, after all, effective in alleviating Ekstrand's condition and, when she presented the medical explanation, the School District backed itself into the corner of trying to explain how some other effective accommodation would be "less expensive" than an accommodation that doesn't cost anything to begin with.

One other important point concerns the court's holding about when the accommodation should have been made. The court didn't hold that the School District should have immediately moved the teacher upon her initial (before the school year) request. Instead, because the accommodation she requested wasn't "so widely known as a necessary treatment for seasonal affective disorder that it should have been obvious to the school district," the court held the School District acted reasonably in not moving her until she submitted the physician's note. The EEOC's Appendix to § 1630.9 permits the employer to require documentation "when the need for an accommodation is not obvious" and the court held "an employer may not be obligated to provide a specifically requested modest accommodation unless the employer is made aware of its medical necessity to the employee." (Some common sense is required here, of course.)

But, once Ekstrand submitted the physician's note, "the school district was obligated to provide Ekstrand's specifically requested, medically necessary accommodation unless it 'would impose an undue hardship' on the school district." Similarly, the EEOC emphasizes that when a request is made the employer "should act promptly to provide the reasonable accommodation" (Q&A # 10) or at least engage in the interactive process "as quickly as possible." (Id.) The simpler the requested accommodation the quicker the employer will be required to provide it. (The EEOC lists several other factors at footnote 38 of its Enforcement Guidance).

Decisions like this one are going to be more common now that the 2008 ADA Amendments have effectively changed the focus of ADA litigation from arguing over whether an employee has a disability to whether the employer accommodated the disability. Smart employers will (they should have done so already) refresh their understanding of the ADA Accommodation requirements.

Job Reassignments and Reasonable Accommodations

One of the more controversial topics under the ADA is to what extent is an employer obligated, as a reasonable accommodation, to transfer an employee to another (vacant) job. It is controversial because, by definition, reassignment only comes into consideration when the employee (the EEOC says), because of a disability, "can no longer perform the essential functions of his/her current position, with or without reasonable accommodation" or undue hardship. It doesn't help that the EEOC takes the position that "The employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to obtain it as a reassignment" leading some courts to disagree with the EEOC.

With passage of the 2008 amendments to the ADA, employers are going to find themselves having to address many more requests for accommodations, a good number of which are going to be job transfer requests. I'm not going to go into all of the rules and considerations that go into whether to accommodate such a request. If you want a refresher, the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reassignments, gets close enough.

What I want to talk about is some of the reasons why, not too long ago, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company found itself on the losing end of a failure to reasonably accommodate ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (governing primarily the New England States) and will, it looks like, have to pay a former insurance salesman more than $1.3 million in damages (attorney fees will be additional). Of course, what I know of the case is based solely on what is written in the court's decision.

Kevin Tobin worked for Liberty Mutual selling insurance for nearly thirty-seven years. Mr. Tobin has bi-polar disorder, diagnosed several years before his termination, and it ultimately appears to have prevented Tobin from performing up to standards in his current sales position. In fact, the court of appeals, in an earlier ruling, upheld Liberty Mutual's decision to terminate Tobin because of his "longstanding performance difficulties" but ordered a trial on Tobin's accommodation claim. At the trial, Tobin argued a reasonable accommodation would have been to assign him to manage "mass marketing" accounts, accounts that are group insurance programs offered to businesses and other institutions in which employees or members are able to purchase insurance policies at a discount. These "MM" accounts are highly sought-after because of the volume and ease at which some can be managed. Liberty Mutual refused, saying that Tobin's sales record made him ineligible for the MM assignments because they were awarded as perks to the best performing agents and that Tobin, because of his disability, could not have handled the stress of the MM accounts in any event. (Stress, the evidence showed, tended to worsen Tobin's mental problems.)

Where Liberty Mutual's case fell apart was in asserting reasons that were not supported by the facts.

It may be true that MM accounts were largely (or even overwhelmingly) assigned as perks for the best performers. There was evidence, including from Tobin's former manager and other sales employees, that MM accounts were not uniformly so assigned. So, while it is true that uniformly applied seniority rules do not have to be ignored in making an accommodation, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002), the catch is that where "one more departure [from the practice] will not likely make a difference," the employee may be able to show a deserved accommodation was wrongly denied.

So in deciding whether or not to transfer an employee with a disability to a vacant job, never look to what you think the transfer standards should be. You must look at your actual past practice in filing the position before denying the accommodation.

Liberty Mutual's other argument – that Tobin's disorder rendered him incapable of handling some of the MM accounts – also fell flat. Sure, the court acknowledged, Liberty Mutual could point to MM accounts that Tobin probably could not handle due to the pressure but that didn't mean, the court said, Tobin could not manage any MM account. There was testimony that some MM accounts were "easy" to manage. Again, the thoroughness of the evaluation at the time was what hung out to dry Liberty Mutual.

Reading between the lines, my take on this case is that Liberty Mutual finally ran out of patience with Mr. Tobin. The court said Liberty Mutual had engaged in the "interactive process" and made other accommodations than the ones at issue in this lawsuit. The provided accommodations, it appears, were geared toward helping the employee perform his old job, there was no indication, Liberty Mutual offered any other accommodation (in this instance, some other vacant job Tobin could have performed). Remember, once an employer offers an accommodation that is reasonable, the employee cannot reject it and demand the employer provide a preferred accommodation.

An employer does not always have to have the patience of Job (it helps, of course) but just a little more patience – in the form of giving Tobin at least the opportunity to fail in working on the MM accounts (or some other job) - could have possibly avoided the outcome in this case.

One of the best services an employment attorney can provide a client is to say when the client is about to make a mistake. It isn't easy or fun to give that message (there is an art to the delivery) but it often saves the client years of heartache, worry, significant money and the risk inherent in litigation. A good defense lawyer also knows how important it is to ask probing and "difficult" questions in rendering advice. So too must an HR manager. If you are going to bet the farm on a position, don't simply ask, "what is the rule," also ask, "what exceptions have been made to that rule." (And take it as a given that no rule is without some exception, even if only a potential one.)

Not every exception or potential exception will require you to grant the accommodation request, however. Under Barnett, the test is whether "one more exception" would make a difference. To determine that, you must examine all the facts, not simply those that might fit the desired outcome.

Accommodations, the Interactive Process, and Supervisors who Listen

Today, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of an ADA claim because the supervisor didn't want to deal with the employee's accommodation request. Now, procedurally, to get a case dismissed prior to trial, the court must assume the employee's testimony is true so who knows what the truth is. The facts according to the employee were that she worked at a Dollar General Store as a cashier. She suffered from degenerative osteoarthritis of her cervical and lumbar spine and other conditions. For some time her supervisors allowed her to use a stool to sit on when she worked but other employees complained that she was getting preferential treatment. Without the stool, the employee couldn't work and so she took medical leave. On return, she was not permitted to use a stool and was told she would be limited to 3 five minute breaks per 6 hour shift. She refused and promptly obtained a doctor's note saying she could return to work and that it would be "beneficial" to let her use the stool. The supervisor, she said, refused to look at the note. She left work and the employer fired her for job abandonment.

The abandonment claim came down to whether or not the employer refused her request for a reasonable accommodation. In a case that comes down to whether or not an employee was reasonably accommodated (or offered an accommodation), the cases specify that "When a party obstructs the process or otherwise fails to participate in good faith, ‘courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then assign responsibility.'" This standard derives from the EEOC's "interactive process" for resolving what kind of an accommodation would be reasonable and effective.

The employer lost - at the early dismissal stage - because it was responsible for the breakdown in the process. It wasn't just that the employer refused to let the employee use a stool, though that was a significant part of the employer's failing. It was that when the employee brought in a note saying she could work if she used a stool, the employer did nothing other than to reject that as an accommodation. Had the employer continued to work with the employee, the result might have been different. For example, the employer in this case argued it proposed a reasonable accommodation of letting her take several breaks. The employee apparently wanted "unlimited" breaks (the decision isn't clear on this). That would probably have not been a reasonable request but if the employer had sat down with the employee and tried to work out a specific break schedule - or even a process for giving her a few more breaks as needed upon a reasonable request to her supervisor - the result here would have been different.

So, employers should make sure the supervisors know that in "negotiating" an accommodation, it is crucial that they listen. They don't have to agree with the employee's request - just listen to it and say, we will consider it and get back to you as soon as possible. The employee cannot assume the worst and the ADA puts the employer in control by saying that if the employer proposes a reasonable accommodation, the employee doesn't get to reject it (as long as, of course, the accommodation is genuinely reasonable).

Can an employer discriminate under the ADA without knowing which major life activity is significantly impaired?

You may have read that the federal appeals court in D.C. held that sexual relations is a major life activity. Somehow that made news.

What was much more interesting about the decision is how the court decided the plaintiff could show (depending on the proof) she met the definition of disability. The plaintiff had breast cancer and testified that her feelings for sex and romance were significantly affected even after her cancer treatments ended (except for regular medication). That was enough, the court said, to constitute a significant limitation where the employee showed she had a "record" of an impairment (the second of three definitions of disability in the ADA).

But, the employer (the government) argued, we did not know she had a substantial limitation of any major life activity so we couldn't have discriminated against her. That didn't matter to the court. It was enough that the government had knowledge of her substantially limiting impairment (or record of an impairment). In fact, government hiring regulations prohibited the government from asking about her ability to perform non-job related functions, and her ability to engage in sexual relations had nothing to do with her job.

The court distinguished the facts here (which it referred to as a "pure discrimination" claim) from the situation where an employee needs a reasonable accommodation because of a substantial limitation. In the latter situation, the employer will necessarily have to know which major life activity is affected so it can make the accommodation.

Several observations are worth contemplating. The decision was not unanimous on this point. There is a difference between not knowing which major life activity is affected and not knowing the employee has a disability. Action taken because of the employee's misconduct is non-discriminatory even if the employer later finds out the misconduct was caused by a mental impairment. And finally, an employer should rarely base significant employment action on whether or not the employee has a disability, as I explained in a prior post.

Making accommodations without a request

Wal-Mart's pharmacies are in the news again for all the wrong reasons.

Last year, a jury decided, according to the Boston Globe, it discriminated against a female pharmacist in Massachusetts, awarding her $2 million in total damages.

Last month, the Wal-Mart agreed to settle a disability discrimination lawsuit brought by the EEOC for a pharmacy technician who claimed Wal-Mart did not accommodate his disability caused by a gunshot wound. The settlement included a $250,000 payment and agreement to conduct ADA training. The quote from the employee (in the EEOC press release) said it all: "After beating all the odds -- surviving my injury when not expected to survive, walking again when told that I would never walk again, and returning to work where I received excellent performance evaluations and consistent merit increases -- I was devastated to have the rug pulled out from underneath me simply because Wal-Mart could ‘no longer accommodate my handicap needs.'"

Last week, the federal court of appeals that decides cases from New York upheld a $900,000 judgment (the jury verdict actually awarded $7.5 million) in a disability discrimination action against Wal-Mart by a 19 year-old pharmacy employee who had cerebral palsy.

Last week's decision provided an interesting lesson for two other reasons. First, the pharmacy supervisor handled the situation poorly (in the jury's view) by her attitude toward the obviously disabled employee, by her refusal to deal with the employee after she concluded he would not "work out," and by her comments about the situation to the store manager who then relayed them to the employee's father (saying to the store manager, I'll reinstate him but "if we get sued, it’s on you" was not the smartest thing in the world comment to make.)

More interesting, however, was the court's holding that Wal-Mart discriminated against the employee by not making a reasonable accommodation to his known disability even though the employee never requested any accommodation. The decision held that where the disability is "known" to the employee, the employer must take the initiative to invoke the "interactive process" of determining whether a reasonable accommodation will permit the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.

The court didn't go into what further the employer must do but the message is clear. When the employee is not able to do some essential (or non-essential function) and the employer knows the employee has a disability (because it is obvious), the employer must act without waiting for the employee to request an accommodation.

Whether other courts will agree remains to be seen. The general rule is that employees must first request an accommodation but, this court held, where the disability is obvious, the employer cannot safely wait for the employee to make the first move.

(I'm not here to bash Wal-Mart. It is a huge corporation with a number of employees. It is going to be sued a good bit and it is going to lose (or settle) a good bit of those lawsuits. And, the settlement and court awards are "news," while the dismissals are buried in the final pages of the business section if reported at all.