Showing posts with label serious health condition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label serious health condition. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Glimpses – Three Recent Sixth Circuit Employment Decisions

The unpublished decisions I'll mention here do not warrant separate (or much) discussion so I'll just summarize the important parts.

One decision, Stimpson v. United Parcel Service, upheld UPS' firing of an employee over the employee's FMLA objections. The employee had been in a bike/car accident and had phoned UPS. The court held the employee had given adequate initial notice of his condition but ultimately rejected the argument that the employee's firing violated the FMLA. The court concluded that the employee had not shown he had a "serious health condition." The employee's medical records showed he had "suffered only contusions and mild to moderate back pain." The return to work forms the employee presented simply said he could not work "for medical reasons." This fell "far short" the court held, of establishing "(1) the date on which the serious health condition began, (2) the probable duration of the condition, (3) the appropriate medical facts within the health care provider's knowledge, and (4) a statement that the employee is unable to perform [his] job duties" as required by prior court decisions. Because the employee failed to show that "his back pain significantly limited his movement or lifting ability, particularly when treated with the prescription [the employee] refused to take", the employee could not establish he had a serious health condition.

The second decision, Johnson v. Interstate Brands Corp., upheld the firing of an employee for fighting. Fighting, of course, requires two (or more) employees and employers often draw pretty fine distinctions in the discipline imposed depending on who started the fight, who escalated it, whether blows were thrown (or made contact) and even the consequences of the fight. This decision is no different. Two female employees fought in the break room. The facts as to who did what were disputed including among the witnesses. One employee (who was not fired) threw water on the fired employee. The fired employee raised her arm to block the water and made contact with the other employee's arm. The employer decided to fire her because she made physical contact but its past disciplinary practices (these were union employees) would not have justified firing the employee who "merely" threw the water on the fired employee. The court upheld this distinction. Flinging water was not, the court said, the same as physically striking someone.

The final one, Harps v. TRW Automotive U.S. LLC, concerns an employer's change to retiree health care benefits. A lot could be written about this area of employment law. It is enough to say generally that when an employer agrees in a collective bargaining agreement to pay health care benefits to retirees, it must do so very carefully. Sixth Circuit law all but creates an irrefutable presumption that the retiree benefits (when established in a CBA) cannot be cancelled after the term of the CBA. Oddly, ERISA does not require retiree health benefits to be "vested." Employers, however, can do so by agreement and that is where the litigation battle occurs. Sixth Circuit caselaw on when language in a CBA will "vest" retiree health benefits is extremely favorable to retirees. So much so that unions and retirees file these kind of lawsuits in the Sixth Circuit even if none of the work was performed within Ohio, Tennessee, Kentucky or Michigan, the States that comprise the Sixth Circuit. These kind of lawsuits can be won, however. In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that the CBA unambiguously disclaimed the employer's obligation to provide retiree medical benefits beyond the term of the CBA. The CBA provision which governed the payment of retiree medical benefits concluded by saying "[t]his clause shall not be construed to convey any rights to those beyond the term of this agreement." I will caution that this level of contract drafting is not for the inexperienced. The costs of providing vested retiree medical benefits can be enormous and there are subtle wording issues that have cost employers significant amounts of money. I mention the Harps case simply because it is relatively rare when the employer wins one of these cases.

Friday, August 15, 2008

Employers May Not Retaliate Against Employees Who Take FMLA Leave

This won't be earth-shattering. It will eliminate any doubts (that most employers didn't have in the first place).

A Dollar General store in Tennessee fired a computer programmer who had a serious health condition. The project on which she was working was behind schedule and missing deadlines. Shortly after she requested FMLA leave, Dollar General began imposing discipline on her. A few weeks later, she was fired. She said at trial that when she was terminated, a supervisor told her "because of your health, I don't think you can do the job." The jury found Dollar General had fired the employee because she took FMLA leave.

On appeal, Dollar General argued that the FMLA does not prohibit employers from terminating employees who have taken FMLA leave. Read literally, Dollar General was correct. The relevant statutory language simplys says that it is unlawful to discriminate against someone "for
for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter." An individual who requests FMLA leave exercises her rights under the FMLA but doesn't necessarily do so by saying the employer is engaging in an "unlawful" practice. Of course, the DOL FMLA regulations say: "employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions" but regulations cannot increase the rights that Congress chose not to add.

The problem is, as the court recognized, that the right to take FMLA would be all but meaningless if an employer could use that leave against the employee. Courts have, moreover, been willing to imply a retaliation prohibition even where the statute does not expressly prohibit retaliation, as I explained in a prior post. It is hardly surprising, therefore, for the Sixth Circuit to read the FMLA as protecting employees because they had exercised FMLA rights. (Given these other decisions, I find some of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning unnecessary but I can't quibble with the results.)

The decision isn't going to come as a shock to most employers in Tennessee. Still, there is merit to reminding Tennessee employers that they should exercise caution and use some common sense when imposing discipline on employees who have taken FMLA leave.